SC|SOM, Student Council, TUM School of Management

Institute for Machine Tools and Industrial Management

Game-Theoretic Evaluation of Supplier Incentives for Sharing Operational Data in Supply Chains

Thesis · Master · Hybrid

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About the role

Background

Resilient and efficient supply chains depend on transparency of operational data. Examples are inventory and capacity information, utilization and delivery-date forecasts, quality metrics, and disruption alerts. Technical frameworks and data spaces such as Catena-X provide the basis for secure, interoperable data exchange between companies. However, the technical ability to exchange data does not automatically lead to its use. Suppliers weigh which data to disclose. They fear competitive disadvantages, a weaker negotiating position, loss of know-how, or extra effort with no visible return. Buyers, in turn, need data to manage demand, capacities, and risks along the supply chain.

Existing game-theoretic literature on this topic mostly treats information sharing in supply chains as a decision about "information" as a whole, and often for a single representative supplier. It remains unclear which types of data which suppliers are willing to share, and under what circumstances. It is also unclear how incentives and data-space design options (e.g. terms of use and access control) affect this selective willingness to share.

Objective

The goal of this thesis is to model and evaluate suppliers' incentive structures for sharing operational data in supply chains using game theory. The focus is on a model that represents different data types and different supplier types. In particular, the thesis addresses the following questions:

  • Classification of data and suppliers: Structure operational data (e.g. inventory, capacity, quality, forecasts) by sensitivity and value. Segment suppliers by relevant characteristics such as market power, dependency, and substitutability.
  • Analysis of willingness to share: Examine which data suppliers are willing to share under which conditions (e.g. contractual relationship, trust, competitive environment, data sovereignty). The analysis draws on literature, case studies, and expert interviews.
  • Game-theoretic modeling: Develop a suitable model (e.g. based on principal-agent or signaling approaches) of the strategic interaction between buyer and supplier under selective data sharing.
  • Evaluation of incentive mechanisms: Compare incentive instruments (monetary, contractual, reputation-based) and data-space design parameters (e.g. terms of use, access control, purpose limitation). Assess them for effectiveness, cost, and equilibrium stability.
  • Derivation of recommendations: Develop practical recommendations for designing data-sharing models and incentive systems in industrial settings, including in the context of data spaces such as Catena-X.

Requirements

  • Degree in economics, industrial engineering, mechanical engineering, computer science, or a comparable field
  • Basic knowledge of supply chain management, production, or data management
  • Interest in game theory, quantitative modeling, and economic analysis; prior knowledge of microeconomics or operations research is an advantage
  • Interest in topics such as Industry 4.0, data spaces, and digital platforms
  • Structured and independent way of working
  • Very good German and English skills

How to apply

Please send your application to niklas.lindholm@iwb.tum.de